







We introduce and analyze expected uncertain utility theory (EUU).Ap r i o ra n da n
interval utility characterize an EUU decision maker. The decision maker uses her subjec-
tive prior to transform each uncertain prospect f into an interval-valued prospect f which
assigns an interval [x,y] of prizes to each state. The decision maker ranks prospects ac-
cording to their expected interval utilities E(u(f)) where u is the index that speciﬁes the
utility of each interval [x,y]. We deﬁne risk and ambiguity aversion for EUU, use the EUU
model address the Allais Paradox, the Ellsberg Paradox, the Home Bias and relate these
behaviors to the individuals attitude towards risk and ambiguity.
† This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation.1. Introduction
We introduce and analyze expected uncertain utility theory (EUU), a model of decision
making under uncertainty. The choice objects are Savage acts that associate a monetary
prize to every state of nature. The goal is to provide a theory that can address three
well-documented deviations from expected utility theory:
(i) Source preference. (Heath and Tversky (1991)). This evidence shows that decision
makers prefer uncertain prospects if they depend on familiar rather than unfamiliar
events.
(ii) Ellsberg-style evidence. (Camerer and Weber (1992)). This evidence shows decision
makers may lack probabilistic sophistication;
(iii) Allais-stye evidence. (Starmer (2000). This evidence shows systematic violations of
the independence axiom.
EUU decision makers are characterized by a sigma-algebra E, a probability measure μ
and a interval utility u(x,y) that associates a real number with every interval of monetary
prizes [x,y]. The sigma-algebra, like the probability and the interval utility , is subjective,
that is, a parameter of the decision maker’s preference. Therefore, a generic act f in the
domain of preferences need note be E-measurable.
The decision maker evaluates each act f according to its expected interval utility
U(f). To compute U(f), we ﬁnd E-measurable acts f1,f2 so that f1 ≤ f is the largest
E-measurable lower bound and f ≤ f2 is the smallest E-measurable upper bound. Then,
U(f)=
R
Ω u(f1(ω),f2(ω))dμ.I ff is E-measurable then f1 = f = f2 and the U(f)r e d u c e s
to subjective expected utility.
Consider an agent who must confront two sources of uncertainty, one is the outcome
of a basketball tournament and the other is the outcome of a tennis tournament. The DM
has prior beliefs about the outcomes each tournament and, therefore, acts that depend
on the outcome of a single tournament give rise to well-deﬁned lotteries over prizes [l,m].
Moreover, the DM ranks those acts according to their implied lotteries. That is, the DM
h a sa( c o n t i n u o u sa n dm o n o t o n e 1) lottery preference that describes his behavior for single
source acts. However, the decision maker prefers basketball bets over tennis bets, that is,
1 In the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
1if given the choice between two bets with identical odds of winning, the decision maker
prefers the one that depends on the outcome of the basketball tournament. Behavior of
this type is referred to as a source-preference. Evidence for non-indiﬀerence among sources
can be found in Heath and Tversky (1991) and Abdellaoui, et al. 2009. In addition, the
ﬁnance literature has coined the phrase “home bias” to describe the preference of investors
for domestic assets. See, for example, French and Poterba (1991) for evidence of the
home bias. The home bias is puzzling because investors forgo the beneﬁts of international
diversiﬁcation in favor of holding familiar assets.
We use the term risky environment to describe a collection of single source acts.
We show that for every EUU decision maker there are many risky environments and the
corresponding lottery preferences vary with the environment. Hence, our model can ac-
commodate agents who exhibit a source preference and forgo the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation
in favor of holding only assets that depend on a preferred source.
The lottery preferences of EUU decision makers form a class of non-expected utility
preferences we term generalized quadratic utility (GQT). GQT utility includes as a special
case rank dependent utility with parameter restrictions that are commonly employed in
empirical studies of lottery preferences (Starmer (2000)). Thus, EUU decision makers
exhibit lottery preferences that match Allais-style experimental evidence.
When acts depend on multiple sources, the decision maker may fail probabilistic so-
phistication. A collection of events is ambiguous if they are not part of a single risky
environment. When EUU decision makers must choose among bets on an ambiguous
collection of events, they will violate probabilistic sophistication and exhibit preference re-
versals as documented in Ellsberg style experiments. We show that EUU can accommodate
all Ellsberg-style urn experiments.
1.1 Related Literature
Our model is most closely related to the work of Jaﬀray (1989) who introduces a dis-
crete model of expected uncertain utility. He takes the set of all discrete totally monotone
capacities over prizes as a primitive and applies the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms
to preferences over such capacities to obtain a linear representation. He applies the Moe-
bius transform to each such capacity and hence identiﬁes it with a probability distribution
2over sets of prizes. Thus, he interprets linear preferences over capacities as expected util-
ity preferences over lotteries over sets. Finally, he argues that sets that have the same
best and worst elements should be indiﬀerent and arrives at an expected uncertain utility
representation.
Just as von Neumann and Morgenstern deﬁne risky lotteries as the object of choice,
Jaﬀray deﬁn e sc a p a c i t i e sa st h eo b j e c t so fc h o i c ef or a decision maker confronting ambi-
guity. In contrast, we provide a Savage-style representation theorem for EUU theory. We
take acts that map states into prizes as the domain of preferences and derive a the decision
maker’s subjective probability and interval utility from her preferences.
We defer a discussion of the relation between EUU theory, Choquet expected utility
theory (Schmeidler (1989) and α-MEU theory (Ghirardato, et al. (2004)) to the ﬁnal
section of the paper.
2. Expected Uncertain Utility
The interval M =[ l,m] is the set of monetary prizes. Let Ω be the state space with
the cardinality of the continuum. The decision maker has preferences over acts, that is,
functions f from Ω to M.L e tF be the set of all acts. Given any σ−algebra E ⊂ 2Ω and
countably additive μ : E → [0,1], we call (E,μ) a prior if it is a complete (i.e., A ⊂ E ∈ E
and μ(E)=0i m p l i e sA ∈ E) and nonatomic (i.e., μ(A) > 0 implies 0 <μ (B) <μ (A)f o r
some B ⊂ A) probability measure.
Let I = {(x,y)|l ≤ x ≤ y ≤ m} be the set of all pairs of prizes. We interpret the
pair (x,y) as a single (subjective) consequence. The pair (x,y) describes a situation that
the decision maker interprets as getting at least x and at most y.G i v e n a p r i o r ( E,μ),
af u n c t i o nf : Ω → I is a subjective interval act if it is measurable with respect to E.A
subjective interval act is tight if μ({ω ∈ Ω|f1(ω)=f2(ω)})=1 . L e tFE denote the set
of all subjective interval acts. For f ∈ FE,l e tfi denote the i’t coordinate of f.T h a t i s ,
f(ω)=( f1(ω),f2(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω. Lemma 1 below reveals that given any prior (E,μ),
each act can be identiﬁed with a unique (up to a set of measure 0) subjective interval act.
Lemma 1: Let (E,μ) be any prior. Then, for any f ∈ F,t h e r ee x i s t sa nf ∈ FE such
that
μ({ω ∈ Ω|f1(ω) ≤ f(ω) ≤ f2(ω)})=1 ( 2 2 )
3and if g ∈ FE also satisﬁes (22),t h e n
μ({ω ∈ Ω|g1 ≤ f1(ω) ≤ f2(ω) ≤ g2(ω)})=1 ( 2 3 )
It is clear than any f with the property above is unique up to a set of measure 0. We
call the f corresponding to any f its envelope.N o t et h a tf ∈ FE if and only if f1 = f = f2
almost (E,μ) - s u r e l y .T h a ti s ,a na c ti sE−measurable if and only if its envelope is tight.
L e m m a2b e l o wi sac o n v e r s eo fL e m m a1 .
Lemma 2: Let (E,μ) be a prior. Then, for any f ∈ FE,t h e r ee x i s t sf ∈ F such that f
is f’s envelope.
Henceforth, we write f,g and h to denote the envelopes of f,g and h respectively. An
interval utility is a continuous function u : I → I R such that u(x,y) >u (x0,y0)w h e n e v e r
x>x 0 and y>y 0.L e t U be the set of all interval utility indicies. A preference º is
a expected uncertain utility (EUU) if there exists a prior (E,μ)a n du ∈ U such that the




Thus, a prior (E,μ) and an interval utility u characterize an EUU decision maker.
Therefore, we identify (E,μ,u) with corresponding the EUU preference º.W e s a y t h a t
the interval utility u is symmetric if there exists α ∈ [0,1] such that u(x,y)=αu(x,x)+
(1 − α)u(y,y) for all (x,y) ∈ I.W es a yt h a tu is strongly symmetric if this α is 1/ 2.
T oi l l u s t r a t et h em a i ni d e a sw eu s et h ef o l l o w i n ge x a m p l et h r o u g ho u tt h ep a p e r :l e t
Ω =[ 0 ,1) × [0,1) be the unit square. Let λ2 be the two-dimensional Lebesque measure
on the two-dimensional Borel sets B2 of Ω and let E be the sigma-algebra that contains
all events of the form [a,b] × [0,1] with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 and all zero measure sets. In this




Consider the act f illustrated in Figure 2 below with prizes x<y<z . The act yields
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Figure 2
We write xAy for an act that yields x on A and y on Ac.T h e e n v e l o p e f for the act f
depicted in Figure 2 is f1 = x,f2 = yE1z and hence
U(f)=μ(E1)u(x,y)+μ(E2)u(x,z)
Theorem 1 below shows that º is an EUU if and only if it satisﬁes the following 6
axioms. Note that the axioms are analogous to their counterparts in Savage’s theorem.
We identify x ∈ M with the constant act that yields x in every state. Hence, the binary
relation º on F induces a binary relation on M.
5Axiom 1: The binary relation º is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2: If f(s) >g (s) for all s ∈ Ω,t h e nf Â g.
W ei n t e r p r e tp r i z e sa sq u a n t i t i e so fm o n e ya n dA x i o m2i san a t u r a lc o n s e q u e n c eo f
that interpretation. For any f,g ∈ F and A ⊂ Ω,l e tfAg denote the act h such that
h(s)=f(s)f o ra l ls ∈ A and h(s)=g(s) for all s ∈ Ac. Hence, xAy denotes the act that
yields x if A occurs and y otherwise.
Our goal is to identify a collection an ideal environment in which each decision-maker
satisﬁes the expected utility axioms and use the decision makers preferences in this en-
vironment to calibrate his attitude towards uncertainty. Consider two acts that imply
diﬀerent subacts on the event E but have a common subact on Ec. If the event E is ideal,
the ranking of acts does not depend on the common subact on Ec. Similarly, if two acts
diﬀer on Ec but have a common subact on E then the ranking of acts does not depend on
the common subact.
Deﬁnition: An event E is it ideal if fEhº gEh and hEf º hEf implies fEh0 º gEh0
and h0Ef º h0Ef.
An event is ideal if Savage’s sure thing principle holds with respect to E and Ec.
Our deﬁnition of ideal events is related to Zhang (2002), Epstein and Zhang (2001) and
Sarin and Wakker (1992) notions of unambiguous events. Sarin and Wakker assume an
exogenous collection of unambiguous events and require Savage’s sure thing principle to
hold for those events. Thus Sarin and Wakker’s unambiguous events yield an environment
in which the decision maker is an expected utility maximizer. Epstein and Zhang deﬁne
unambiguous events to be those events for which a weakened version of the sure thing
principle applies. Hence, their unambiguous events yield a single environment in which
the decision maker may be an expected utility maximizer or may have some nonexpected
utility functional over subjective lotteries. Our permits multiple collections of unambiguous
events. The collection of ideal events yields an environment in which the stronger Sarin
and Wakker’s stronger requirement is satisﬁed. Our remaining axioms ensure the existence
distinct environments; across these environments, the decision-maker reveals a rich variety
of risk attitudes.
6An event A is null if fAh∼ gAh for all f,g,h ∈ F.I fA is not null, we call it non-null.
Let E be the set of all ideal events and E,E0,E i etc. denote elements of E.L e tE+ ⊂ E
denote the set of ideal events that are not null.
An event is diﬀuse if it and its complement intersect every non-null ideal event. Diﬀuse
events represent outcomes in situations of complete ignorance. The decision maker cannot
ﬁnd any (non-null) ideal event contained in it or its complement and hence cannot bound
the probability of such events. Let D be the set of all diﬀuse events and let D,D0,D i etc.
denote elements of D.
Deﬁnition: An event D is diﬀuse if E ∩ D 6= ∅ 6= E ∩ Dc for every E ∈ E+.
In the example above, any subset D ∈ B2 o ft h eu n i ts q u a r ei sd i ﬀuse if and only if
λ2(D ∩ (A1 × [0,1))) 6=06= λ2(Dc ∩ (A1 × [0,1)))
whenever μ(A1 × [0,1)) > 0; that is, whenever A1 has strictly positive (one-dimensional)
Lebesque measure.
Our maintained hypothesis (formalized in Axiom 3(ii)) is that the decision maker can-
not discriminate among diﬀuse events. That is, the decision maker is indiﬀerent between
betting on D1 and D2 when both events are diﬀuse. This indiﬀerence reﬂects the decision
maker’s complete ignorance over diﬀuse outcomes. Axiom 3(i) below is Savage’s compar-
ative probability axiom (P4) applied to ideal events. Axiom 3(ii) says that diﬀuse events
are interchangeable.
Axiom 3: If x>yand x0 >y 0,t h e n( i )xEy º xE0y implies x0Ey0 º x0E0y0 and (ii)
xDy ∼ xD0y.
Let Fo denote the set of simple acts, that is, acts such that f(Ω)i sﬁnite. The simple
act f ∈ Fo is ideal if f−1(x) ∈ E for all x.L e tFo
E denote the set of ideal simple acts. A
simple act f is diﬀuse if f−1(x) ∈ D ∪∅ . An act is constant if f−1(x) ∈ Ω ∪∅ .L e tFd be
the collection of constant or diﬀuse simple acts. Note that constant acts are in Fd and in
Fo
E.
The standard state independence assumption requires that the ranking of constant
acts be the same conditional on any non-null event. Axiom 4 below requires the same
7for ideal events. In that sense, Axiom 4 below weakens the standard state independence
assumption. However, Axiom 4 requires state independence to hold not just for constant
acts but for all diﬀuse acts that is, acts that are measurable with respect to the collection
of diﬀuse events. This strengthening of state-independence follows from our hypothesis
that diﬀuse events are interchangeable. To see this, consider the diﬀuse act xDy.T h e
event D ∩ E is a diﬀuse subset of E as is the event Dc ∩ E. Therefore, conditional on
any ideal event E,t h ea c txDy yields x on a diﬀuse subset of E and y on its (diﬀuse)
complement in E. Therefore, xDy is analogous to a constant act; it yields identical diﬀuse
bets conditional on any ideal event. If utility is state independent, the ranking of diﬀuse
acts must therefore be preserved when conditioning on a non-null ideal event.
Axiom 4: If E is nonnull, then f Â g implies fEhÂ gEh for all f,g ∈ Fd.
Axiom 5 is Savage’s divisibility axiom for ideal. It serves the same role here as in
Savage. Its statement below is a little simpler than Savage’s original statement because in
our setting, there is a best and a worst prize.
Axiom 5: If f,g ∈ Fo
E and f Â g, then there exists a partition E1,...,E n of Ω such
that lEif Â mEig for all i.
Axiom 6 below is a strengthening of Savage’s dominance condition adapted to our
setting. We use it to extend the representation from simple acts to all acts, to establish
continuity of u and to guarantee countable additivity of the prior (E,μ). Notice that for
ideal acts f ∈ Fo
E Axiom 6(i) implies Arrow’s (1970) monotone continuity axiom, the
standard axiom used to establish countable additivity of the probability measure in SEU.
Axiom 6: (i) If fn ∈ Fo
E converges pointwise to f,t h e ng º fn º h for all n implies
g º f º h.( i i ) I f fn ∈ F converges uniformly to f,t h e ng º fn º h for all n implies
g º f º h.
Theorem 1: The binary relation º satisﬁes Axioms 1 − 6 if and only if there is a prior
(E,μ) a n da ni n t e r v a lu t i l i t yu such that º=( E,μ,u). Moreover, the prior is unique and
the interval utility is unique up to positive an aﬃne transformation.
Proof: See Appendix.
8Next, we provide a brief description of the proof of Theorem 1. If we restrict attention
to ideal events, Axioms 1-6 yield a standard expected utility theory with a countably
additive probability measure ν and a continuous utility index v : M → I R.
A partition act is a simple act f with the following property. There is a partition of Ω
into the ideal events (E1,...,E k) and a collection of diﬀuse or constant acts (f1,...,f k)
such that f coincides with fk on Ek. A key step in the proof of Theorem 1 is to show that
for any simple act ˆ f ∈ Fo we can ﬁnd an equivalent partition act f. Equivalent acts diﬀer
only on null events. As part of this argument, we show that Ω can be partitioned into any
ﬁnite number of diﬀuse sets. This step uses a Theorem by Birkhoﬀ (1967) which in turn
uses the continuum hypothesis.2
A binary partition act is a partition act where each fk is either a constant act or takes
the form xDy for some x,y and some diﬀuse set D. A simple monotonicity argument shows
that any partition act is indiﬀerent to a binary partition act. To see this, let D1,D 2,D 3
be a partition of Ω into three diﬀuse events and consider the act xD1yD2z with x<y<z .
By monotonicity
xD1yD2z º xD1 ∪ D2z
and
xD1z º xD1yD2z
and by Axiom 3,
xD1 ∪ D2z ∼ xD1z
and therefore xD1 ∪ D2z ∼ xD1yD2z ∼ xD1z.
The diﬀuse act f = xDy has the constant envelope f =( x,y). The utility u(x,y)o f
(x,y)i st h eu t i l i t yo ft h i sa c t ,t h a ti s ,
u(x,y): =U(xDy)
2 Birkhoﬀ (1967), Theorem 13 (pg. 266) shows that no nontrival (i.e., not identically equal to 0)
countably additive measure such that every singleton has measure 0 can be deﬁned on the algebra of all
subsets of the continuum.
9More generally, consider a binary partition act f with partition (E1,...,E k)t h a ty i e l d s





The extension to all acts uses Axiom 6 and follows familiar arguments.
3. Environment and Revealed Lottery Preferences
In this section we deﬁne risky environments and characterize the lottery preferences
of EUU decision makers. The lottery preferences are shown to be environment dependent
and therefore EUU decision makers exhibit a source preference, that is, prefer lotteries
derived from one source over the same lotteries derived from another source.
A collection C of subsets of Ω is a λ-system if (i) ∅,Ω ∈ C; (ii) A ∈ C implies Ac ∈ C;
and (iii) A,B ∈ C and A ∩ B = ∅ implies A ∪ B ∈ C. The collection C is continuous if
An ∈ C and An ⊂ An+1 for all n implies
S
n An ∈ C. For any such C,l e tFC denote the set
of all C-measurable acts from Ω to M.T h a ti s ,f ∈ FC if and only if f−1(X) ∈ C for any
Borel set X ⊂ M.W ec a l ls u c ha nFC an environment. Henceforth, when we write FC it
is understood that C is a continuous λ-system and therefore FC is an environment.
Let L denote the set of all cumulative distribution functions, F, such that F(m)=1
and F(x)=0f o ra l lx<l .G i v e na n yp r i o r( A,π), λ-system C ⊂ A,a n da c tf ∈ FC,t h e
cumulative distribution Gf ∈ L is deﬁned as
Gf(x)=π(f−1[l,x])
A preference relation ºl on L is monotone if G Âl G0 whenever G stochastically dominates
G0.T h i sp r e f e r e n c ei sc o n t i n u o u si ft h ew e a k l y - b etter-than sets and the weakly-worse-than
sets are closed in the topology of weak convergence. We call a monotone and continuous
preference ºl on L a lottery preference.
We say that the EUU º is probabilistically sophisticated on FC if there exists a lottery
preference ºl and a prior (A,π) such that C ⊂ A and
f º g if and only if Gf ºl Gg (4)
10for all f,g ∈ FC.
Suppose the EUU º is probabilistically sophisticated on some FC. Hence, there exists
some prior (A,π)a n dºl such that equation (4) is satisﬁed. We call (A,π) a possible
prior and ºl a possible lottery preference (for º on FC) . I f ,i na d d i t i o n ,f o ra l lA ∈ C,
r ∈ [0,1], there exists B ∈ C, B ⊂ A such that π(B)=rπ(A), then we say that FC is a
risky environment. It is easy to check that if FC is a risky environment, then there is a
unique possible lottery preference of º on FC. Moreover, any two possible priors (A,π)
and (B,π0)o nFc for º will agree on C ⊂ A ∩ B. Since we are only interested in the
probabilities of events in C,w es i m p l ys a yt h a tº reveals the prior (A,π) and the lottery
preference ºl on FC.
Next, we provide two examples of risky environments and describe the lottery prefer-
ences revealed in those environments.
Example 1 (Expected Utility): Ideal acts, that is, acts that are E-measurable, are an
example of an environment. The sigma-algebra E is a continuous λ-system and therefore
FE is an environment. The EUU is probabilistically sophisticated on FE and therefore FE
is a risky environment. The lottery preference of the EUU (E,μ,u) is expected utility with
utility index v(x)=u(x,x).
Example 2 (Quadratic Utility): Let f,f0 be two E-measurable acts such that
(i) f and f0 are uniformly distributed, i.e., Gf(x)=Gf
0
(x)=x/(m − l)f o rx ∈ [l,m]
(ii) f and f0 are independent, i.e, μ({f ≤ x,f0 ≤ x})=Gf(x) · Gf0
(x).
Fix a diﬀuse set D,l e th = fDf0,a n dl e tA be the smallest sigma-algebra that contains
the sets h−1(B) for all Borel subsets of [0,1]. The sigma-algebra A is a continuous λ-
system and the collection of acts FA is a risky environment. Any act h0 ∈ FA has the
form h0 = gDg0 for some g,g0 such that g,g0 are independent and identically distributed
ideal acts. The acts f1 =m i n {g,g0} and f2 =m a x {g,g0} are an envelope for h = gDg0.
The joint distribution of f1 and f2 is
H2(x,y|Gg): =
½
Gg(x)2 − (Gg(y) − Gg(x))2 if x ≥ y
Gg(x)o t h e r w i s e
and therefore U(h0)=
R
u(x,y)dH2(x,y|Gg). Thus, the lottery preference in this envi-





11utility function is known as quadratic utility (Machina (1989)). Let φ(x,y)b eas y m m e t r i c
extension of u(x,y)t oa l lp a i r s( x,y) ∈ M × M.T h a ti s ,
φ(x,y)=
½







The right hand side of the above equation is the quadratic utility function as analyzed in
Chew, Epstein and Segal (1991).
Examples 1 and 2 describe speciﬁc risky environments and the corresponding lottery
preference of EUU decision makers. Theorem 2 below characterizes the lottery preferences
of EUU decision makers in all risky environments. Let
Z =
n




For F ∈ L,l e t
Hn(x,y |F)=
½
(F(y))n − (F(y) − F(x))n if y ≥ x
(F(y))n otherwise
Note that Hn(x,y |F) is the joint distribution of the 1-st and n-th order statistics of n
independent draws of an F-distributed random variable.
Deﬁnition: Af u n c t i o nV : L → I R is a generalized quadratic utility (GQU) if there






u(x,y)dHn(x,y |F)( 1 )
We write (a,u) for a lottery preference represented by a GQU with parameters a,u.
The interval utility u is strongly symmetric if u(x,y)=( u(x,x)+u(y,y))/2. We say the
EUU (E,μ,u)i sregular if it is not strongly symmetric.
Theorem 2, below, shows that for any EUU (E,μ,u) there is an environment where
the EUU reveals the GQU (a,u). Moreover, unless the u is strongly symmetric, all lottery
12preferences are generalized quadratic. Strongly symmetric utility functions allow additional
risky environments for which the lottery preference does not have a GQU form.
Theorem 2: (i) For any prior (E,μ) and a ∈ Z, there exists a risky environment FA
such that for all u ∈ U,t h eE U U(E,μ,u) reveals (a,u) on FA.( i i ) I f t h e r e g u l a r E U U
(E,μ,u) reveals ºl in some risky environment then ºl is a GQU (a,u) for some a ∈ Z.
The risky environments deﬁn e di nE x a m p l e s1a n d2a b o v ed e p e n do nt h eE U U ’ sp r i o r
but are independent of the interval utility. As we demonstrate in Proposition 1 below, this
property is general.
Proposition 1: (i) If FA is a risky environment for the regular EUU (E,μ,u) then it
is a risky environment for any EUU (E,μ,u 0) and both reveal the same prior on FA. (ii)
If the regular EUU (E,μ,u) reveals the lottery preference ºl in some environment and
(E0,μ 0) is any prior, then (E0,μ 0,u) reveals the same lottery preference ºl in some risky
environment.
Proposition 1 (i) shows that the prior rather than the interval utility deﬁnes an envi-
ronment because almost all EUU preferences with a given prior have the same collection of
environments. The only qualiﬁcation is that a strongly symmetric interval utility yields a
larger class of environments. Part (ii) of Proposition 1 is a immediate corollary of Theorem
2.
The notion of a risky environment enables us to formalize the two ways in which the
EUU model achieves separation between the individual’s perception of uncertainty and
risk, as described by her prior, and attitude towards this uncertainty and risk, as described
by u. F i r s t ,a sP r o p o s i t i o n1s h o w s ,w h a tc o n s t itutes a risky environment depends only
on the prior and not on the interval utility. Second, every prior perceives every risky
environment. That is, just as in the Savage model, a nonatomic prior forces the decision-
maker to confront every risky (and uncertain) situation; two diﬀerent priors may disagree
on which events have probability .6 (or, in our more general model, which collection of
acts constitute a risky environment), but both confront the entire range of probabilities
and risky environments.
134. Measures of Uncertainty and Uncertainty Aversion
An EUU’s lottery preference depends on the environment. It is risk averse in a given
environment if it dislikes mean preserving spreads in that environment. It is strongly
uncertainty averse if it dislikes mean preserving spreads in all environments.
Deﬁnition: An EUU º is risk averse in the risky environment FA if for all f,g ∈ FA,
f º g whenever Gg is a mean preserving spread of Gf.
Deﬁnition: An EUU º is strongly uncertainty averse if it is risk averse in every risky
environment.
We say that u is maximally pessimistic if u(x,y)=u(x,x) for all x,y. For any u,l e t
ρu(x)=u(x,x)f o ra l lx. Hence, u is maximally pessimistic, u(x,y)=ρu(x) for all x,y.
To simplify notation, we let (E,μ,ρ) denote a maximally pessimistic EUU. The following
proposition shows that for EUU preferences, our notion of strong uncertainty aversion is
equivalent to risk aversion in the ideal environment plus maximal pessimism. Furthermore,
this notion has a characterization similar to Schmeidler’s notion of uncertainty aversion.
Proposition 2: Let (E,μ,u) be an EUU. Then, the following conditions are equivalent
(ii) The EUU (E,μ,u) is strongly uncertainty averse;
(ii) ρu is concave and [f ∈ F, α ∈ [0,1] and g = f implies αf +( 1− α)g º f];
(iii) ρu is concave and u is maximally pessimistic.
Deﬁnition: Let FA,FB b er i s k ye n v i r o n m e n t sf o rt h ep r i o r(E,μ).T h eE U U(E,μ,u)
prefers FA to FB if f ∈ FA,g∈ FB, Gf = Gg implies f º g.T h er i s k ye n v i r o n m e n tFB
is more uncertain than FA if every strongly uncertainty averse (E,μ,u) prefers FA to FB.
Theorem 2 shows that we can associate to each risky environment FA a parameter
a ∈ Z such that the EUU’s lottery preference is represented by the GQT (a,u)i nt h i s




Proposition 3: Let (E,μ) be a prior and FA,FB be two risky environments with pa-
rameters a,b ∈ Z. Then, FB more uncertain than FA if and only γa(t) ≥ γb(t) for all
t ∈ [0,1].
14Proposition 3 provides a measure of uncertainty for environments. The ideal envi-
ronment has parameter a =( 1 ,0,...) while the quadratic environment has parameter
b =( 0 ,1,0,...). Since t ≥ t2 for all t ∈ [0,1], Proposition 3 shows that the quadratic envi-
ronment is more uncertain than the ideal environment. More generally, let an ∈ Z be such
that an = 1 (and hence ak =0f o ra l lk 6= n). Then, the environment with parameter an+1
is more uncertain than the environment with parameter an. Of course, not all environ-
ments can be ranked. For example, the environment with parameter a0 =( 1/ 4,0, 3/ 4,0...)
and the environment with parameter b =( 0 ,1,0,...)c a n n o tb er a n k e d .
Consider a sequence of environments with parameters an,n =1 ,2,....H e n c e , a s n
goes to inﬁn i t yt h e s ee n v i r o n m e n t sb e c o m em o r ea n dm o r eu n c e r t a i n .F o ra n yl o t t e r yF
let CEn(F)b et h ec e r t a i n t ye q u i v a l e n to fF for the GQU (an,u). Let x(F)a n dy(F)b e




Thus, as n goes to inﬁnity, the agent ranks lotteries according to their support.
5. Allais Paradox
A typical Allais-style reversal occurs if a decision maker prefers the certain prize y over
the lottery F but reverses this ranking if both prosp e c t sa r em i x e dw i t ha nu n d e s i r a b l e
outcome x.W es a yt h a ta ni n t e r v a lu t i l i t yi sp r o n et oA l l a i ss t y l er e v e r s a l si fw ec a nﬁnd
risky environments where such reversals occur. Recall that y(F) is the minimal element
in the support of F.
Deﬁnition: The interval utility u is prone to Allais-reversals if there exist a ∈ Z, F ∈ L,
x ≤ y(F), z ∈ M and α ∈ (0,1) such that V (F) <V (z) and V (αF +( 1− α)x) >
V (αz +( 1− α)x) for V =( a,u).
Deﬁnition: The interval utility u displays risk loving under extreme uncertainty if there
exists a ∈ Z and F ∈ L such that V (F) >V (z(F)) for all b ∈ Z with γa ≤ γb and
V =( b,u).
15Proposition 4: The following conditions are equivalent
(i) u is not maximally pessimistic;
(ii) u is prone to Allais-reversals;
(iii) u displays risk loving under extreme uncertainty.
Proposition 4 shows that to capture Allais-style reversals we must choose interval
utility indices that are not maximally pessimistic. We know from Proposition 2 above
that such u’s cannot be risk averse in every environment. Proposition 4 shows that, more
speciﬁcally, risk aversion will be violated in very uncertain environments.
An interval utility u is symmetric separable if it satisﬁes
u(x,y)=αv(x)+( 1− α)v(y)( 3 )
We write (E,μ,(α,v)) for an EUU with a symmetric separable interval utility. To illustrate
Proposition 4, consider the example
u(x,y)=3/ 4 · x + 1/ 4 · y
Consider a lottery F that yields x>0 with probability p and 0 with probability 1 −p.I n








(1 − (1 − p)n
¶
If x = 300 and p = .8a n dn ≥ 3 then the decision maker prefers a certain prize of 200
over the lottery F but reverses this ranking when both prospects are combined with a
1/2 chance of 0. More generally, this decision maker is prone to Allais-style reversals if
the environment is more uncertain than an for n ≥ 3. To see the relation to risk loving
behavior, note that for n ≥ 3a n dp suﬃciently small, the decision maker prefers F to
its expected value. Hence, the decision maker is risk loving for gambles that oﬀer a small
chance of winning in uncertain environments.
Next, consider the “source preference” of this decision maker. If p =1 /2a n dt h e r e f o r e
F oﬀer an equal chance of winning (the prize x) and losing (the prize 0), then the decision
maker prefers less uncertain environments. If Vn(F) is the utility of F in environment an
16then Vn(F)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nn.H o w e v e r ,i fp is small (for example p = .1) and hence the
lottery F oﬀers a small chance of winning, then the ranking of environments is reversed.
In that case Vn(F)i si n c r e a s i n gi nn and the decision maker prefers more uncertain envi-
ronments. A similar reversal of the source preference as a function of the odds of winning
h a sb e e nd o c u m e n t e di ne x p e r i m e n t a ls e t t i ngs (see Curley and Yates (1989) and Camerer
and Weber (1992) for a survey.)
Next, we characterize the lottery preferences of EUUs with symmetric separable in-
terval utilities. We show below that those lottery preferences correspond to a subclass of
rank dependent expected utility (RDEU) (Quiggin (1982)). RDEU is characterized by a
utility index v and a continuous bijection ν :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] called the probability trans-
formation function (PTF). For any cdf F ∈ L we write ν ◦ F for the cdf G such that
G(x)=1−ν(1−F(x)). The preference ºl is a rank-dependent expected utility preference
(RDEU) if there exists a PTF ν and a continuous, strictly increasing function v : M → I R
such that R deﬁned by
R(G)=
Z
v(x)dν ◦ G (4)
represents ºl.W ew r i t eR =( ν,v) to describe a particular RDEU utility function.
Deﬁne the function γ∗
a(t)=1−
P∞
n=1 an(1 − t)n and note that γ∗
a(t)=1− γa(1 − t).
Proposition 5: The interval utility (α,v) reveals ºl in a risky environment with pa-
rameter a if and only if ºl is the RDEU (ν,v) for ν = αγa +( 1− α)γ∗
a.
In his survey of evidence on lottery preferences, Starmer (2000) notes that PTF’s with
an inverted S-shape, that is, concave on [0,t ∗] and convex on [t∗,1] for some t∗ ∈ (0,1),
provide a good ﬁt of experimental data. PTFs of the form
αγa +( 1− α)γ∗
a
are inverted S-shaped whenever the environment is suﬃciently uncertain and 0 <α<1.








17is S-shaped for all n ≥ 3. More generally, for any α ∈ (0,1), there exists a ∈ Z such that if
the environment is more uncertain than an environment with parameter a then the PTF
is inverted S-shaped.
6. The Ellsberg Paradox
In this section, we analyze “urn experiments,” that is, situations where the relevant
uncertainty is described by a ﬁnite number of events corresponding to the possible draws
from an urn. To describe urn experiments in our setting, let N be a ﬁnite set of events,
let N be the set of subsets of N and let T : Ω → N be an onto function. Hence, AM =
{T−1(L)|L ∈ N}is the sigma-algebra of events corresponding to the urn experiment.
Some events have intuitive probabilities because the experimenter gives objective in-
formation such as the total number of balls of a particular type. For example, the urn may
contain three diﬀerent kinds of balls, red, blue and yellow and the experimenter may tell
the subject the total number of blue or yellow balls. Then, if the total number of balls is n
and there are m blue or yellow balls, then the probability of the event L = {B,Y} is m/ n.
Let M be the set of events with intuitive probabilities and let ι : M → [0,1] be
the function that assigns intuitive probabilities to events in M. We require that ι satisfy
the following conditions: there are probability measures p,q on N such that (i) p(L)=
q(L)=ι(L)f o ra l lL ∈ M and (ii) p(L) 6= q(L)f o rL 6∈ M.T h eﬁrst property requires
that the intuitive probabilities are consistent, that is, there is a way to assign probabilities
to the states that matches all intuitive probabilities. The second property says that M
contains all events that have intuitive probabilities. Any event L 6∈ M can be assigned
multiple probabilities consistent with the intuitive probabilities in M. Note that (i) and
(ii) imply that M is a λ-system of subsets of N s i n c ed i s j o i n tu n i o n so fe v e n t sw i t hi n t u i t i v e
probabilities must have intuitive probabilities themselves. The triple (N,M,ι)i sc a l l e da n
urn experiment.
Next, we illustrate our deﬁnition of urn experiments in the context of well-known
examples.
Ellsberg One-urn Experiment: The urn contains 90 balls; 30 are red and the remain-
ing 60 balls are either black or yellow. The exact number or black balls is not known.
18Hence, N = {R,B,Y }, M = {{R},{B,Y}}. The intuitive probability of drawing an
R is ι({R})=1/ 3 and that of drawing a B or a Y is ι({B,Y})=2/ 3. The intuitive
probabilities satisfy properties (i) and (ii) for p({R})=p({B})=p({Y })=1/ 3 and
q({R})=1/ 3;q({B})=0 ,q({Y })=2/ 3.
Ellsberg Two-Urn Experiment: Next, consider the Ellsberg two-urn experiment. Each
urn contains 100 balls. In urn 1, there are 50 Red balls and 50 white balls. Each ball
in urn 2 is either black or yellow, but the exact number of black balls is not known.
One ball is drawn from each urn. Let N = {(R,B),(R,Y ),(W, B),(W, Y )} and M =
{{(R,B),(R,Y )},{(W,B),(W, Y )}} with ι({(R,B),(R,Y )})=ι{(W,B),(W,Y )}} = 1/ 2.
The intuitive probabilities satisfy properties (i) and (ii) for p({(R,B)})=p({(W, B)})=
0;p({(R,Y )})=p({(W, Y )})=1/ 2 and q({(R,B)})=q({(W,B)})=1/ 2;q({(R,Y )})=
q({(W, Y )})=0 .
Zhang’s Four-Color Urn: The urn has 100 balls; each ball is either brown, green or
red, white. The only objective information is that B+R=B+G=50. That is, the to-
tal number balls that are blue or red and the total number balls that are blue or green
is both 50. From, this fact we can deduce that G + W = R + W = 50 and hence
to collection of events to which probabilities can readily be assigned is the λ-system
M = {∅,{R,G},{G,B},{G,W},{B,W},N} of N = {B,G,R,W}.F o r e a c h t w o e l e -
ments subset of M we have ι(L)=1/ 2. The intuitive probabilities satisfy properties (i)
and (ii) for p({R})=p({G})=1/ 2,p({B})=p({W})=0a n dq({R})=q({G})=
0,p({B})=p({W})=1/ 2.
Fix any prior (E,μ). We say that the collection of sets Co is unambiguous if there
exists a risky environment FA such Co ⊂ A. Otherwise, we say that Co is ambiguous. If Co
is unambiguous but Co ∪ {A} is not, then we say that A is ambiguous with respect to Co.
We say that (E,μ) rationalizes the urn experiment (N,M,ι) if there exists an onto
function T : Ω → N such that AM = {A ⊂ Ω|A = T−1(L),L∈ M} is unambiguous with
ap o s s i b l ep r i o r( A,π) satisfying π(T−1(L)) = ι(L)a n de a c hA ∈ AN\AM is ambiguous
with respect to AM.
Proposition 6: Every (E,μ) rationalizes every urn experiment (N,M,ι).
19Proposition 6 shows that EUU theory can accommodate Ellsberg-style evidence. In
Ellsberg-style experiments some events are ambiguous, that is, they do not belong to a
common risky environment. Notice that ambiguity is not a property of an event but
of a collection of events. The event A is ambiguous relative to the event C i ft h e r ei sn o
risky environment that contains both. At the same time, the event A may be unambiguous
relative to the event B because both are contained in a single risky environment. Consider,
for example, the Ellsberg two-urn experiment described above with n colors in each urn.
The second urn speciﬁes that there are 100 balls and n potential colors while the ﬁrst
urn provides the exact number of balls for each color. Given the symmetry of the second
urn, it is plausible that the decision maker views each color to be equally likely and,
more generally, ranks bets that depend only on urn 2 according to the number of winning
colors. In other words, if we consider acts that depend only on urn 2, the decision maker
is probabilistically sophisticated. Thus, the events “red is drawn from urn 2” and “black
is drawn from urn 2” are unambiguous. At the same time, the events “black is drawn
from urn 1” and “red is drawn from urn 2” are ambiguous because they do not belong
to a common risky environment and therefore cannot be assigned probabilities by the
decision maker. Note that this notion of ambiguity adopts the terminology of Chew and
Sagi (2008).
Recently, Machina (2009) has posed the following question regarding the ability of
Choquet expected utility theory (and related models) to accommodate variations of the
Ellsberg paradox that appear plausible and even natural. In this subsection, we will show
that within EUU theory the behavior described by Machina is synonymous with the failure
of separability of u. We say that a EUU preference u is separable if there exist functions
v1 and v2 such that u(x,y)=v1(x)+v2(y).
Next, we describe Machina’s urn experiment: Let N = {1,2,3,4}. To be concrete,
suppose a ball will be drawn from an urn that is known to have 20 balls. It is also known
that 10 of these balls are marked 1 or 2 and the other 10 balls are marked 3 or 4. Thus,
the λ-system of events with intuitive probabilities is M = {∅,{1,2},{3,4},N}.
We identify each f ∈ F = {g : N → M} with (f(1),f(2),f(3),f(4)) ∈ M4. Machina
(2008) observes that if ºo is any Choquet expected utility preference such that
(x1,x 2,x 3,x 4) ∼o (x2,x 1,x 3,x 4) ∼o (x2,x 1,x 4,x 3) ∼o (x4,x 3,x 2,x 1)( 9 9 )
20for all x1,x 2,x 3,x 4 ∈ M,t h e nw em u s th a v e( x1,x 2,x 3,x 4) ∼o (x1,x 3,x 2,x 4). He notes
that this indiﬀerence may not be a desirable restriction for a ﬂexible model. Machina
arguments means that a decision maker may not be indiﬀerent between a ﬁfty-ﬁfty bet
over the interval (0,200) and (50,100) versus a ﬁfty-ﬁfty bet over the consequences (0,100)
and (50,200); that is, he may prefer “packaging” 200 with 50 and 100 with 0 rather than
the other way around.
Call it an M-reversal if a EUU preference is not indiﬀerent between (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4)
and (x1,x 3,x 2,x 4)f o rs o m exi ∈ M, i =1 ,2,3,4, despite satisfying equation (99). Then,
M a c h i n aa r g u e st h a ti m p o s i n gn oM - r e v e r s a l sis a possibly unwarranted restriction on a
model of uncertainty. Below, we show that an EUU decision maker has no M-reversals if
and only if her interval utility is not separable.
Af u n c t i o nβ : M2 → I R is symmetric if β(x,y)=β(y,x)f o ra l lx,y ∈ M.L e t ºo
be a binary relation on F. The preference ºo is a Machina preference if there exists a
continuous, increasing function and symmetric function β such that the function V deﬁned
by
V (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4)=β(x1,x 2)+β(x3,x 4)
for f ∈ F represents ºo.
Proposition 7: Let β be a Machina preference and (E,μ) be any prior. Then, there
exists a unique u ∈ U such that (E,μ,u) explains β.T h i su is separable if and only if β
has no M-reversals.
7. EUU, Choquet and α-MEU
In this section, we relate EUU to Choquet expected utility (Scheidler (1989)) and
to expected utility theory (Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004)). Speciﬁcally,
we ask the following question. Suppose we observe the behavior of a decision maker
in a setting with ﬁnitely many states and this decision maker has a Choquet expected
utility representation or a α−MEU representation. Under what conditions is this behavior
consistent with EUU? This motivates the following deﬁnition.
21Deﬁnition: Let N be any nonempty, ﬁnite set, F = {f : N → M} and ºo ab i n a r y
relation on F.W es a yt h a tt h eE U Uº explains ºo if there exists T : Ω → N such that
f ºo g if and only if f ◦ T º g ◦ T for all f,g ∈ F.
Let N be a ﬁnite and nonempty set. A function λ : N → [0,1] is a probability if
P
n∈N λ(n)=1 .T h ef u n c t i o nc : N → [0,1] is a capacity if (i) c(L) = 1, (ii) c(∅) = 0; (iii)
c(K) ≤ c(L) whenever K ⊂ L ∈ Ω.T h e c a p a c i t y c is totally monotone if there exists a





for all L ∈ N.
A binary relation ºo=( c,v)o nF is a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) if c is a





represents ºo, where the integral above denotes the Choquet integral.
Proposition 8: Let c be a totally monotone capacity, (E,μ) be any prior and (c,ρ) be
any CEU. Then, the maximally pessimistic EUU (E,μ,ρ) explains (c,ρ).
Let ∆o be the set of all probabilities on some ﬁnite nonempty N.L e t ∆L = {λ ∈
∆|
P
n∈L λ(n)=1 }. The set of probabilities ∆ is a simple mixture if there exist a





For F = {f : N → M} and α ∈ [0,1], the binary relation º is an α-minmax expected
utility (α-MMEU) if there exists a compact set of probabilities ∆ and a continuous ρ :










22Proposition 9: Let ∆ be any simple mixture, (E,μ) be any prior and (∆,α,ρ) be any
α-MMEU. Then, the symmetric separable EUU (E,μ,(α,v)) explains (∆,α,ρ).
Propositions 8 and 9 show the extent to which EUU decision capture the behavior
corresponding to CEU and α-MEU. As we show in Proposition 7, both CEU and α-MEU
allow no M-reversals while EUU with a non-separable utility index does.
8. Appendix A: Preliminary Results
F o rt h ep r i o r( E,μ)l e t





where the {Ei} ranges over all sequences such that Ei ∈ E and A ⊂
S
i Ei.S i n c e E is a
σ−ﬁeld, this deﬁnition is equivalent to
μ∗(A)= m i n
A⊂E∈E
μ(E)
That is, there exists E ∈ E such that A ⊂ E and μ(E)=μ∗(A). Call such an E a sheath of
A. Clearly, the symmetric diﬀerence between any two sheaths of a given set A has measure
0.
Lemma A1: For any set A ⊂ Ω, there exists a partition E1,E 2,E 3 ∈ E of Ω such that
(i) E1 ⊂ A ⊂ E1 ∪ E2 and (ii) μ∗(E2 ∩ A)=μ∗(E2 ∩ Ac)=μ(E2). (iii) If ˆ E1, ˆ E2, ˆ E3 also
satisfy (i) and (ii), then μ([Ei ∩ ˆ Ec
i] ∪ [ ˆ Ei ∩ Ec
i]) = 0 for all i =1 ,2,3
Proof: Choose sheaths ˆ EEfor A and Ac respectively. Then, let E1 = Ec, E2 = E ∩ ˆ E
and E3 = Ω\(E1 ∪ E2). Clearly, E1 ⊂ A.N o t e t h a tˆ Ec ⊂ Ac ⊂ E.T h e n ,x/ ∈ E1 ∪ E2
implies x ∈ Ec
1 ∩Ec
2 = E ∩[E ∩ ˆ Ec]c = E ∩ ˆ Ec = ˆ Ec and hence x/ ∈ A.T h u s ,A ⊂ E1∪E2.
Finally, note that μ∗(A)=μ(E1 ∪ E2)=μ(E1)+μ(E2) ≥ μ∗(E1)+μ∗(E2 ∩ A).
Since μ∗ is subadditive, we have μ∗(E1)+μ∗(E2 ∩ A) ≥ μ∗(E1 ∪ [E2 ∩ A]) = μ∗(A).
Thus, μ∗(E2)=μ(E2)=μ∗(E2 ∩ A). A symmetric argument yields μ(E2)=μ∗(E2 ∩ Ac)
establishing (i) and (ii).
To prove the uniqueness claim, note that the argument above showed that if ˆ E is a
sheath for A and E is a sheath for Ac,t h e nE1 = Ec, E2 = E ∩ ˆ E and E3 = Ω\(E1 ∪E2)
23have the desired properties. It is easy to see that the converse is true as well: if E1,E 2,E 3
have the desired properties, then E1 ∪ E2 is a sheath for A and E2 ∪ E3 is a sheath for
Ac∗. This establishes the uniqueness assertion.
For any E ∈ E,l e t[ E] denote the equivalence class of sets in E that diﬀer from E by
a set of measure 0. Then, deﬁne [E] ∧ [E0]=[ E∗]f o rE∗ ∈ [E ∩ E0], [E] ∨ [E0]=[ E∗]
for E∗ ∈ [E ∪ E0]a n d¬E =[ E∗]f o rE∗ ∈ [Ec]. Let S(A)=[ E∗] for some sheath E∗ of
A ⊂ Ω. By Lemma A2, S(A)i sw e l l - d e ﬁned for all A ⊂ Ω.L e t[ E]={[E]|E ∈ E}.I ti s
easy to verify that [E]i saB o o l e a nσ−algebra partially ordered by the binary relation ≤,
where [E] ≤ [E0] if and only if [E] ∧ [E0]=[ E]. When there is no risk of confusion, we
o m i tt h eb r a c k e t sa n dw r i t eE ∨ E0,¬E etc.
We say that {E1,...E n} ∈ [E] is a partition if (i) [Ei] ∧ [Ej] 6=[ ∅]i fa n do n l yi fi = j
and (ii) Ω = E1 ∨ E2,...,∨En. A partition act ¯ f is deﬁned as a one-to-one map from
some partition P of ([E]) to the set of nonempty ﬁnite subsets of M.W el e tP ¯ f denote the
partition that is the domain of ¯ f. The partition act ¯ f is equivalent to the act f if for all





(ii) ¯ f(E) ⊂ f(E0) for all E,E0 such that μ(E) > 0a n dE0 ⊂ E
(∗)




f]={S(f−1(Z)) ∈ [E]|Z ⊂ M}
and let [Ef] be the smallest sub σ−algebra of [E]t h a tc o n t a i n s[ E0
f]. Note that [E0
f]a n d
therefore [Ef]a r eb o t hﬁnite. Let
Pf = {[E] ∈ [Ef]\[∅]|E0 ∈ [Ef]i m p l i e sE0 ∧ E ∈ {[E],[∅]}
Hence, Pf is the set of minimal elements in [Ef]\[∅]. We claim that Pf is a partition.




ˆ E = Ω.L e tT = {E ∈ [Ef]|[∅] <E≤
V
ˆ E∈Pf ¬ ˆ E}.I fT is nonempty,
then it must contain a minimal element E and therefore, E ∈ Pf.H e n c e , [ ∅] <E≤
V
ˆ E∈Pf ¬ ˆ E ≤ ¬E and therefore E =[ ∅], a contradiction. This proves that T is empty and
therefore
V
ˆ E∈Pf ¬ ˆ E =[ ∅]w h i c hi m p l i e s
W
ˆ E∈Pf
ˆ E = Ω as desired.
Deﬁne ¯ f(E)=
T
ˆ E∈[E] f( ˆ E) for all E ∈ Pf.C h o o s eE0 ⊂ E such that μ(E0) > 0. Let
Z = f(E0)a n dl e tE∗ = S−1(Z) ∈ [E0
f]. Note that f(E0) ∩ ¯ f(E) 6= ∅.S i n c eE∗ ∈ [E0
f]a n d
[E] ∈ Pf,w ec o n c l u d e[ E] ≤ E∗ and therefore ¯ f(E) ⊂ f(E∗)=f(E0)p r o v i n g( ∗).
Next, we will show that ¯ f is a partition act with the domain P ¯ f = Pf.I fx/ ∈ ¯ f( ˆ E),
then μ(f−1(x) ∩ ˆ E) = 0. Since μ(E) > 0f o rE ∈ Pf it follows that ¯ f(E)c a n n o tb e
empty for E ∈ Pf. W eh a v ee s t a b l i s h e da b o v et h a tPf i sap a r t i t i o n . S ot op r o v et h a t
¯ f is a partition act with P ¯ f = Pf, we need only show that ¯ f is one-to-one. Assume that
¯ f(E)= ¯ f( ˆ E)=Z,f o rE, ˆ E ∈ Pf.T h e n ,f o ra l lE0 ∈ [E0
f], E ⊂ E0 if and only if ˆ E ⊂ E0.
Therefore, the same holds for all E0 ∈ [Ef]. Since E, ˆ E ∈ [Ef], we have E = ˆ E as desired.
Finally, let ¯ g be some other partition act that is equivalent to f.C h o o s eE1 ∈ P ¯ f and




f( ˆ E)=¯ g(E2)
Then, the one-to-oneness of ¯ f ensures that E1 ∧ E2 6=06= E0
1 ∧ E2 implies E1 = E0
1 for
all E1,E0
1 ∈ P ¯ f and E2 ∈ P¯ g. Hence, P ¯ f = P¯ g and since both ¯ f,¯ g are equivalent to f,w e
have ¯ f =¯ g as desired.
Henceforth we write ¯ f t od e n o t et h ep a r t i t i o na c tt h a ti se q u i v a l e n tt of.
Lemma 1, below, was stated in the text in section 2.
Lemma 1: Let (E,μ) be any prior. Then, for any f ∈ F,t h e r ee x i s t sa nf ∈ FE such
that
μ({ω ∈ Ω|f1(ω) ≤ f(ω) ≤ f2(ω)})=1 ( 2 2 )
and if g ∈ FE also satisﬁes (22),t h e n
μ({ω ∈ Ω|g1 ≤ f1(ω) ≤ f2(ω) ≤ g2(ω)})=1 ( 2 3 )
25Proof: We ﬁr s tp r o o ft h er e s u l tf o rs i m p l ea c t s .L e t ¯ f b et h eu n i q u ep a r t i t i o na c te q u i v -
alent to f ∈ F0. Choose a partition P of Ω such that {[E]|E ∈ P} = P ¯ f and let Eω be
the unique element of P that contains ω.D e ﬁne
f1(ω): =m i n¯ f([Eω])}
f2(ω): =m a x¯ f([Eω])
From the construction of interval acts it follows that μ({ω : f1(ω) ≤ f(ω) ≤ f2(ω)})=1
and f ∈ FE. By the deﬁnition of interval acts ¯ f([Eω]) = ∩ ˆ E∈[Eω]f( ˆ E)a n df(E) ⊃ ¯ f([Eω])
for any E ⊂ Eω with μ(E) > 0. Therefore any g ∈ FE such that
μ({ω ∈ Ω|g1(ω) ≤ f(ω) ≤ g2(ω)})=1
must satisfy μ({ω ∈ Ω|g1(ω) ≤ min ¯ f([Eω])})=1a n dμ({ω ∈ Ω|g2(ω) ≥ max ¯ f([Eω])})
w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e s( 2 3 ) .
Next, consider a general act f.L e tw = m−l and zn
i = l+wi2−n for all i =0 ,1,...,2n.
For any x,y ∈ M,l e ti(n,x)=m a x {i|zn
i ≤ x} and j(n,y)=m i n {j |zn
j ≥ y}. The function
i is increasing in both arguments while j is decreasing in the ﬁrst argument and increasing
in the second argument. Let gn(ω)=i(n,f(ω)) and hn(ω)=j(i,f(ω)). Since gn and hn
a r es i m p l ef u n c t i o n st h eﬁrst part of the proof implies that there are interval acts gn and
h
n corresponding to gn and hn.N o t et h a th
n(ω) is a decreasing sequence and therefore




i (ω) ≤ w2−n for i =1 ,2i tf o l l o w st h a tl i mg∞ = f. We claim that h is an
interval act for f.T os e et h i s ,ﬁr s tn o t et h a tf o ra l ln
μ({ω ∈ Ω|gn
1(ω) ≤ f(ω) ≤ h
n
2(ω)})=1
since hn ≥ f ≥ gn.T h e r e f o r e ,
μ({ω ∈ Ω|f1(ω) ≤ f(ω) ≤ f2(ω)})=1
26Next, observe that if g satisﬁes
μ({ω ∈ Ω|g1(ω) ≤ f(ω) ≤ g2(ω)})=1
then for all n





μ({ω ∈ Ω|g1(ω) ≤ f1(ω) ≤ f2(ω) ≤ g2(ω)})=1
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
As e tD is diﬀuse if μ∗(D)=μ∗(Dc)=1 .
Lemma A3: Assume the continuum hypothesis holds. If (E,μ) is a nonatomic proba-
bility then (i) there exists a diﬀuse set D ⊂ Ω. (ii) For any natural number n,t h e r ee x i s t s
a partition (D1,...,D n) of Ω with Di ∈ D for i =1 ,...,n.
Proof: Birkhoﬀ (1967) page 266, Theorem 13 proves the following: no nontrival (i.e., not
identically equal to 0) measure such that every singleton has measure 0 can be deﬁned on
the algebra of all subsets of the continuum.
For each A ⊂ Ω,l e tE1 ⊂ A be such that μ(E1)=μ(A)a n dl e tE3 ⊂ Ac be such that
μ(E3)=μ(Ac). Deﬁne N(A)=( E1 ∪E3)c.C a l lN(A)∩A the completely nonmeasurable
part of A.L e tα =s u p {μ(N(A))|A ⊂ Ω}.W en o t et h a tt h i sα is attained. To see this, let
Ai be a sequence such that limμ(N(Ai)) = α.D e ﬁne Bi as follows: B1 = A1∩N(A1)a n d
Bi+1 = Ai ∩N(Ai+1)∩(
S
j≤i N(Ai)c). Note that N(B1 ∪...∪Bi)=N(A1)∪...∪N(Ai)
and
S∞
i=1 Bi is completely nonmeasurable in
S∞
i=1 N(Ai). Since limμ(N(Ai)) = α,w e
have μ(
S∞
i=1 N(Ai) ≥ α showing that α is attained.
If α<1, then we would ﬁnd A such that μ(N(A)) = α and use Birkhoﬀ result to
ﬁnd B ⊂ N(A)c with μ(N(B)) > 0t og e tC = B ∪(A ∩N(A)) with μ(N(C)) >μ (N(A))
contradicting the maximality of α.H e n c e ,α = 1. Then, choose D such that μ(N(D)) = 1
and note that D is a diﬀu s es e t .T h i sp r o v e sp a r t( i ) .
Next, we will show any diﬀuse set can be partitioned into two diﬀuse sets. Then,
as i m p l ei n d u c t i v ea r g u m e n ty i e l d sp a r t( i i ) . L e tD be any diﬀuse set and deﬁne Σ1 =
27{E ∩ D|E ∈ E}, μ1(E ∩ D)=μ(E). Note that since D is diﬀuse, μ(E ∩ D)=μ(E0 ∩ D)
implies that E,E0 diﬀer by a set of measure 0. Hence, (D,Σ1,μ 1)i sap r o b a b i l i t ys p a c e
and μ1({s})=0f o rs ∈ D. Since infE⊃D μ(D)=1 ,D cannot be countable. Then, by
the Continuum Hypothesis, the cardinality of D must be the continuum. Repeated the
argument in part (i) above yields a diﬀuse subset of D1 of D. Then, for any E such that
μ(E) > 0, we have μ1(E∩D) > 0a n dt h e r e f o r eE∩D1 6= ∅. A symmetric argument yields
E ∩ [D\D1] 6= ∅. Hence, D1,D\D1 are diﬀuse in Ω.
Lemma A3 is used to establish Lemma 2 (stated in the text). For completeness, we
r e s t a t eL e m m a2b e l o w .
Lemma 2: Let (E,μ) be a prior. Then, for any f ∈ FE,t h e r ee x i s t sf ∈ F such that f
is f’s envelope.
Proof: Since (E,μ) is a prior, there exists a diﬀuse set D.L e tf = f1Df2. We claim that
f is an interval act for f.F i r s t , n o t e t h a t f1(ω) ≤ f(ω) ≤ f2(ω) for all ω. Second, note
that since D is diﬀu s ei tf o l l o w st h a tμ∗(D ∩ E)=μ(E)a n dμ∗(Dc ∩ E)=μ(E)f o ra l l
E ∈ E. It follows that for any g ∈ FE with μ({g1(ω) ≥ f(ω) ≥ g2(ω)})=1w em u s th a v e
inf g1(E) ≥ supf1(E) for all E ∈ E with μ(E) > 0. It is straightforward to show that this
implies μ(g1(ω) ≥ f1(ω) = 1. An analogous argument shows that μ(f2(ω) ≥ g2(ω)) = 1.
9. Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we prove Theorem 1. The proof is divided into a series of Lemmas. It
is understood that Axioms 1-6 hold throughout.
Lemma B1: (i) f(s) ≥ g(s) for all s ∈ Ω implies f º g.( i i )f Â g implies f Â z Â g
for some z ∈ M. (iii) fn,g n ∈ F, fn converges uniformly to f, gn converges uniformly to
g, g Â f implies gn Â fn for some n.( i v ) fn,g n ∈ Fo
E, fn converges pointwise to f, gn
pointwise to g, g Â f implies gn Â fn for some n.
Proof: To prove (i), let fn = 1
nl +(n−1
n )f and gn = 1
nl +(n−1
n )g. Then, fn converges to
f uniformly and gn converges to g uniformly. By Axiom 2, fn Â gn. Then, by Axiom 6,
f º gn and applying Axiom 6 again yields f º g as desired.
28To prove (ii), assume f Â g and let y =i n f {z ∈ M |z º f} and let x =s u p {z ∈
M |g º z}.B y( i )a b o v e ,x and y are well-deﬁned. Axiom 6 ensures that y ∼ f and z ∼ g
and therefore y Â x.T h e n ,f o rz =
x+y
2 ,w eh a v ef Â z Â g.
To prove (iii), let g Â f and apply (ii) three times to get z,y,x such that g Â z Â
y Â x Â f. Axiom 6 ensures that gn Â y and y º fn for all n large enough. Therefore,
gn Â fn for all such n. Analogous argument proves (iv).
Lemma B2: The collection E is a σ−ﬁeld.
Proof: First, we note that E is a ﬁeld. That E ∈ E implies Ec ∈ e i so b v i o u sa si st h ef a c t
that ∅∈E. Hence, to show that E is a ﬁeld, we need to establish that E,E ∈ E implies
E ∩ E ∈ E.
Suppose fE∩E0h º gE∩E0h. We must show that fE∩E0h0 º gE∩E0h0.N o t et h a t
fE∩E0h =( fEh)E0h.S i n c eE0 ∈ E we have (fEh)E0h0 º (gEh)E0h0.N e x t ,o b s e r v et h a t
(fEh)E0h0 =( fE0h0)E(hE0h0). Since E ∈ E we have fE ∩ E0h0 =( fE0h0)E(h0E0h0) º
(gE0h0)E(h0E0h0)=gE ∩ E0h0 as required. A symmetric argument yields h0E ∩ E0f º
h0E ∩ E0g if hE ∩ E0f º hE ∩ E0g and therefore E is a ﬁeld.
To prove that the ﬁeld E is a σ−ﬁeld, it is enough to show that if Ei ∈ E and
Ei ⊂ Ei+1,t h e n
S
Ei ∈ E.L e tEi ⊂ Ei+1 for all i.N o t et h a tˆ fEiˆ g converges pointwise
to ˆ f
S




Eih0 or h0 S
Eig Â h0 S
Eif for some
f,g,h,h0 ∈ Fo
E,b y( i v )a b o v e ,w eh a v egEnh0 Â fEnh0 or h0Eng Â h0Enf for some n,
proving that Ei ∈ E for all n implies
S
i Ei ∈ E.
Lemma B3: There exists a ﬁnitely additive, convex-ranged probability measure μ on E
and a function v : Ω → I R such that the function V : Fo





represents the restriction of º to Fo
E.
Proof: Note that Axiom 1 implies Savages P1, Axiom 2 implies P2. By deﬁnition P3
is satisﬁed for acts in Fo
E, Axiom 3 yields P4, Axiom 4 yields P5, and ﬁnally, Axiom 5
yields P6. Then applying the proof of Savage’s Theorem to all acts in Fo
E yields the desired
29conclusion. This is true despite the fact that Savage’s theorem assumes that the underlying
σ−ﬁeld is the set of all subsets of Ω; the arguments work for any σ−ﬁeld. σ−ﬁeld. Hence,
the result follows from Savage’s theorem restricted to simple acts (i.e., Fo). .
Lemma B4: The probability measure μ on E is countably additive and complete.
Proof: To show that μ is countably additive, we need to prove that given any sequence Ei
such that Ei+1 ⊂ Ei for all i and E∗ :=
T
i Ei = ∅, limμ(Ei) = 0. Suppose limμ(Ei) > 0.
Then, by Axiom 5, there exists E such that limμ(Ei) >μ (E) > 0. Hence, μ(Ei) >μ (E)
for all i;t h a ti smEil Â mEl for all i.B u tmEil ∈ Fo
E and converges pointwise to mE∗l.
Hence, mE∗l º mEl Â l. Therefore, μ(E∗) > 0 as desired.
To see that μ is complete, let fEg ∼ g for all f,g.S i n c e E ∈ E i tf o l l o w st h a tf o r
A ⊂ E,( fAg)Eg ∼ g for all f,g and therefore fAg ∼ g for all f,g.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t
A ∈ E and therefore μ is complete.
Lemma B5: The function v is strictly increasing and continuous.
Proof: That v is strictly increasing follows from y Â x whenever y>x .T o p r o v e
continuity, let ErE be any event such that μ(Er)=r.S u p p o s er0 =l i mv(xn) <v (x)f o r
some sequence xn in X.T h e n , c h o o s e r ∈ (r0,v(x) and note that x Â hErl º xn for n
large. Therefore, x Â hErl º limxn = x, a contradiction. Hence, r0 ≥ v(x). A symmetric
argument proves r0 = v(x)a n dy i e l d st h ec o n t i n u i t yo fv.
Lemma B6: For any y,x and diﬀuse act D,t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u ez ∈ X such that
yDx ∼ z.
Proof: Let z =s u p {w ∈ X |yDx º w}.S i n c e ,yDx º l by Axiom 2, z is well-deﬁned.
Then, we can construct two sequences yn ≥ z and z ≥ xn such that both sequences
converge to z and yn º yDx, yDx º xn. Hence, by Axiom 6, z º yDx º z as desired.
Lemma B7: Let D1,...,D n ∈ D be a partition of Ω and yi+1 ≥ yi for i =1 ,...,n− 1
and deﬁne f : Ω → X as follows: f(s)=yi whenever s ∈ Di.T h e n ,f ∼ ynDy1 for all
D ∈ D.
30Proof: By monotonicity, yn[D2 ∪ ...∪ Dn]y1 º fynDny1. By Axiom 5, yn[D2 ∪ ...∪
Dn]y1 ∼ ynDny1 ∼ ynDy1.
Lemma B8: (i) For any partition act g, there exists some simple act f such that g = ¯ f.
(ii) For any partition act ¯ g and E ∈ P¯ g,t h e r ee x i s th ∈ Fo and f ∈ Fd such that hEf = f
and ¯ h =¯ g.
Proof: Let ¯ f be the partition act and n be the maximum of the cardinality of ¯ f(E)f o rE ∈
P ¯ f.D e ﬁne an onto function tE : {D1,...D n} → ¯ f(E)f o re a c hE ∈ P ¯ f.L e tD1,...,D nD
be a partition of D.C h o o s eap a r t i t i o nP ⊂ E of Ω such that {[E]k,E∈ P}= P ¯ f.D e ﬁne
the act f as follows: for all s ∈ E ∩ Dn f(s)=tE(Dn). Then, ¯ f is equivalent to f.T h i s
proves (i).
Let ¯ g(E)={y1,...,y n} and D1,...,D n be a diﬀuse partition, the existence of which
is guaranteed in Lemma A3 (ii). By part (ii), we can choose h0 ∈ Fo so that ¯ h0 =¯ g.D e ﬁne
f(s)=yi if and only if s ∈ Di.L e th = fEh0. Hence, ¯ h =¯ g as well. Note that h,f have
the desired properties.
For any partition act ¯ f and E ∈ P ¯ f,w ed e ﬁne
x(E, ¯ f): =m i n¯ f(E)
y(E, ¯ f): =m a x¯ f(E)






P( ¯ f)={Exy( ¯ f) x,y ∈ M}
Note that P( ¯ f) is a partition that is coarser than P ¯ f;t h a ti s ,f o rE ∈ P ¯ f there exists a
unique ˆ E ∈ P( ¯ f)s u c ht h a tE = E ∧ ˆ E. Finally, we deﬁne the partition act f∗ on P( ¯ f)a s
f∗(Exy)={x} ∪ {y}
We call f∗ the binary partition act of f.
31Lemma B9: (i) ¯ f =¯ g,t h e nf ∼ g.( i i )I ff∗ =¯ g,t h e nf ∼ g.
Proof: For all f,g such that ¯ f =¯ g and E ∈ P ¯ f,l e tT(E)=0i ft h e r ee x i s t sE0 ∈ [E]
such that f(s)=g(s)f o ra l ls ∈ E0 and T(E) = 1 otherwise. We will prove the result
by induction on the cardinality of the set of E ∈ P ¯ f such that T(E)=1 . I ft h i ss e ti s
empty, then f,g diﬀer on a set E ∈ E such that μ(E)=0 . H e n c e ,gEcm º f º gEcl
by Lemma B1(i). Similarly, we have fEcm º f º fEcl.S i n c e E is null, we have
fEm = gEm ∼ gEl = fEl and therefore f ∼ g. Next, assume the assertion holds
whenever the cardinality of E ∈ P ¯ f such that T(E)=1i sk and consider E ∈ P ¯ f for
some f,g for which this cardinality is k +1 . C h o o s eE0 ∈ [E]s u c ht h a tT(E)=1a n d
let n be the cardinality of ¯ f(E). Since T(E)=1 ,n>1. Hence, ¯ f(E)={y1,...,y n} for
yi <y i+1. Choose a partition D1,...D n ∈ D and let h be the act yields yi on Di for all
i.L e tD∗
i =[ Di ∩ Ec] ∪ [f−1(yi) ∩ E]f o ra l li.I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tD∗
i is diﬀuse for
all i.C o n s i d e r t h e a c t h0 that yields yi on each D∗
i. By Lemma B9(i) and Axiom 4(ii),
h0 ∼ h.T h a ti s ,fEh∼ h. A similar argument yields fEh∼ h, therefore fEh∼ gEh and
ﬁnally, fEg ∼ g. But notice that for f and fEg, the cardinality of the set of [E0] ∈ P ¯ f
such that T(E0)=1i sk and hence by the inductive hypothesis f ∼ fEg and therefore
f ∼ g proving part (i).
The proof is by induction on the cardinality of the set
{E ∈ P ¯ f | ¯ f(E) 6=¯ g( ˆ E)f o r ˆ E such that E ≤ ˆ E}
When that cardinality is 0, the one-to-oneness of partition functions ensures that ¯ f =¯ g =
f∗ a n dt h e np a r t( i )y i e l d sf ∼ g. Suppose the cardinality of that set is k+1andpickany
element E of that set. Let ˆ E be the element of P¯ g such that E ∩ ˆ E = E.C h o o s ef0 ∈ Fd
and h ∈ Fo such hEf0 = f0 and ¯ h = ¯ f. Similarly, choose g0 ∈ Fd and h∗ ∈ Fo such
h∗ ˆ Eg0 = g0 and ¯ h∗ =¯ g.S i n c e¯ f(E) 6=¯ g( ˆ E), we know that both the cardinality of ¯ f(E)
and that of ¯ g( ˆ E)m u s tb eg r e a t e rt h a n1 .H e n c e ,b yL e m m aB 7 ,h ∼ h∗.S e tf0 = h∗Ef.
It follows from Axiom 3 that f0 ∼ hEf = f.N o t e t h a t Pf0 = Pf and the cardinality
of the set {E ∈ P ¯ f0 | ¯ f0(E) 6=¯ g( ˆ E)f o r ˆ E such that E ≤ ˆ E} is one smaller than that of
{E ∈ P ¯ f | ¯ f(E) 6=¯ g( ˆ E)f o r ˆ E such that E ≤ ˆ E}. Hence, by the inductive hypothesis,
f0 ∼ g yielding f ∼ g.
32Deﬁnition: Let u : I → I R be deﬁned as u(x,y)=v(z) for z such that yDx ∼ z.
Lemma B10: The function u is increasing and continuous.
Proof: Suppose yDx ∼ z and ˆ yDˆ x ∼ ˆ z.I fˆ y>yand ˆ x>x ,t h e nA x i o m2i m p l i e sˆ z Â z
and applying Axiom 2 again yields ˆ z>zas desired. If ˆ y ≥ y and ˆ x ≥ x, then by Lemma
B1(i), ˆ z º z. Then, applying Axiom 2 again yields ˆ z ≥ z.
To prove continuity, assume yiDxi ∼ zi for i =1 ,... and lim(xi,y i)=( x,y). Since
zis are in a compact set in proving continuity, we can assume this sequence converges to
some z. Suppose yDx Â z and note that since yiDxi converges uniformly to yiDxi and
the act zi converges uniformly to z, we have by Lemma B1(iii), yiDxi ∼ zi for some i,a










(ii) If u(x([E],f∗),y([E],f∗)) = u(z,z) for [E] ∈ Pf∗,t h e nU(zEf)=U(f) for E ∈ [E].
Proof: For part (i) let f be a simple act and let [E] ∈ Pf∗ and E ∈ [E]. Then,
μ({ω ∈ Ω|f(ω)=( x([E],f∗),y([E],f∗)} = μ(E)=μ([E])
and therefore part (i) follows.
If Pf∗ = P(zEf)∗, part (ii) follows immediately from part (i). If not, then there
exists E0 ∈ Pf∗ such that f∗(E0)={z}. Then, part (i) together with the fact that
μ(E ∪ E0)=μ(E)+μ(E0) yield the desired conclusion.
Let d(f)b et h ec a r d i n a l i t yo ft h es e t{E ∈ Pf∗ |f∗(E) is not a singleton}.H e n c e ,i f
d(f)=0 ,t h e nf ∈ Fo
E.
Lemma B12: The function U represents the restriction of º to Fo.





Hence, by Lemma B3, the restriction of U to F0 represents º. Suppose U represents
the restriction of º to Fn and choose f,g ∈ Fn+1.D e ﬁne hf as follows: if f ∈ Fn,
then hf = f. Otherwise, choose E ∈ Pf∗ such that the cardinality of f∗(E)i sn o t
1. Hence, y(E,f∗) >x (E,f∗). Lemma B6 ensures that there exists a unique z such
that u(z,z)=u(x(E,f∗),y(E,f∗)). By construction, y(E,f∗)Dx(E,f∗) ∼ z. Hence, by
Axiom 3, zEf ∼ f. By Lemma B9(ii), U(zEf)=U(f). Hence, set hf = zEf.C o n s t r u c t
an hg i nt h es a m ef a s h i o n .T h e n ,f º g if and only if hf º hg. By the inductive hypothesis,
hf º hg if and only if U(hf) ≥ U(hg). Since U(hf)=U(f)a n dU(hg)=U(g), the desired
result follows.
Lemma B13 shows that U as deﬁned above represents the preference for all acts.
Lemma B13 completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma B13: The function U represents º.
Proof: Note that for all f, there exists xf such that U(xf)=u(xf,x f)=U(f). This
follows from that fact that u is increasing in both arguments and continuous which implies
u(m,m) ≥ U(f) ≥ u(l,l) and by the intermediate value theorem u(xf,x f)=U(f)f o r
some xf ∈ [l,m]. The monotonicity of u ensures that this xf is unique. Next, we show
that f ∼ xf.
Without loss of generality, assume l =0( i fn o tl e tl∗ =0a n dm∗ = m−l and identify
each f with f∗ = f −l and apply all previous results to acts F∗ = {f −l|f ∈ F}.) Deﬁne
for any x ≥ 0a n d >0, z∗(x, )=m i n {n |n =0 ,1,... such that n  ≥ x}. Similarly, let
z∗(x, )=m a x {n |n =0 ,1,... such that n  ≤ x}.C l e a r l y ,
0 ≤ z∗(x, ) − x ≤ z∗(x, ) − z∗(x, ) <  (4)
and the ﬁrst two inequalities above are equalities if and only if x is a multiple of  .
Set fn(ω)=z∗(f(ω),m2−n)a n dfn(ω)=z∗(f(ω),m2−n) for all n =0 ,1,....E q u a -
tion (4) above ensures that fn ≥ f ≥ fn and fn,f n converge uniformly to f.N o t e a l s o
34that fn,f n ∈ Fo with fn ↓ f. This implies that (for a measure 1 subset) f







Since fn ≥ f,w eh a v eU(fn) ≥ U(f)=U(xf) for all n.S i n c e U represents the
restriction of º to Fo,w ec o n c l u d et h a tfn º x for all n. Then, Axiom 6 implies f º x.A
symmetric argument with fn replacing fn yields xf º f and therefore xf ∼ f as desired.
To conclude the proof of the Lemma, suppose f º g,t h e nU(xf)=U(f)a n dU(xg)=
U(g)a n dxf ∼ f º g ∼ xg.S i n c e U represents the restriction of º to Fo,w ec o n c l u d e
that U(xf) ≥ U(xg) and hence U(f) ≥ U(g). Similarly, if U(f) ≥ U(g)w ec o n c l u d e
f ∼ xf º xg ∼ g and therefore f º g.
Uniqueness follows from standard arguments and is therefore omitted.
10. Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2 and Proposition 1
Recall that for any prior (E,μ)a n dA ⊂ Ω,
μ∗(A)= m a x
E⊂A,E∈E
μ(E)
Hence, μ∗ is the inner extension of μ to 2Ω.
Lemma C1: Suppose C ⊂ A is a continuous λ-system, (A,π) is a prior and there exists
a ∈ Z such that μ∗(A)=γa(π(A)) for all A ∈ C. Then, for any interval utility u, FC is a
risky environment for (E,μ,u), (A,π) is the revealed prior and the GQU (a,u) represents
the lottery preference.








where Hf is the two dimensional distribution of f,t h ee n v e l o p eo ff.N o t et h a t
H(x,y)=μ∗({f(ω) ≤ y}) − μ∗({f(ω) ∈ (x,y]})
Let Gf be the cdf of f for the prior (A,π). Since μ∗(A)=γa(π(A)) for all A ∈ A it follows
that
H(x,y)=γa(Gf(y)) − γa(Gf(y) − Gf(x))
35This demonstrates that (i) for any two acts f,g ∈ FA, Gf = Gg implies f ∼ g; (ii)
the lottery preference is the GQU (a,u). It is straightforward to show that the GQU is
continuous and increasing in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. Hence, Fc is a
risky environment with a revealed prior (A,π).
Lemma C2: Suppose FC is a risky environment with a possible prior (A,π) for some
EUU (E,μ,u) such that u is not strongly symmetric. Then, there exists a ∈ Z such that
μ∗(A)=γa(π(A)) for all A ∈ C.
Proof: Let FC be a risky environment, (A,π)b et h ep r i o ra n dºl be the lottery preference
that º reveals on FC. Fix a partition Pk = {A1,...,A k} of Ω such that Ai ∈ A and
π(Ai)=1 /k for all i.L e tZ = {z1,...,z k} ⊂ M be a k-element set and let f be the simple
act that yields zi on Ai for i =1 ,...,k. Finally, let ¯ f be the partition act corresponding to
f.R e c a l lt h a t¯ f is a one to one map from Pk to the non-empty subsets of Z.T os i m p l i f y
the notation below, we deﬁne ¯ f−1 :2 Z → Pk∪∅as the inverse of ¯ f extended to all subsets
of prizes. If a set of prizes X is not attained by any element of Pf,t h e n ¯ f−1(X)=∅.L e t
|X| denote the cardinality of the set X.
Step 1: μ( ¯ f−1(X)) = μ( ¯ f−1(X0)) if |X ∩ Z| = |X0 ∩ Z|.
Take any y,x ∈ M such that u(x,y) 6=[ u(y,y)+u(x,x)]/2. Since u is not strongly
symmetric such a x,y exit. Then, without loss of generality, (if necessary, by taking an
positive aﬃne transformation of u)a s s u m eu(y,y)=1 ,u(x,x)=0a n du(x,y)=u∗ 6=
1/ 2.T o p r o v e s t e p 1 , l e t αi = μ( ¯ f−1(zi)), αj = μ( ¯ f−1(zj)), βi :=
P
X:zi/ ∈X μ( ¯ f−1(X))
and βj =
P
X:zj / ∈X μ( ¯ f−1(X)), for some i,j.L e t g = yf−1(zi)x,g0 = yf−1(zj)x, h =
xf−1(zi)y,g0 = xf−1(zj)y.S i n c e g,g0,h,h 0 ∈ Fc, g,g0 yield the same lotteries and h,h0
yield the same lotteries, we have U(g)=U(g0)a n du(h)=U(h0) and hence,
αi +( 1− αi − βi)u∗ = αj +( 1− αj − βj)u∗
βi +( 1− αi − βi)u∗ = βj +( 1− αi − βi)u∗
Some simple manipulations reveal that since u∗ 6=1−u∗ the two equations above can only
be satisﬁed if αi = αj and βi = βj.
Next, assume Step 1 is true for all sets of prizes with cardinality less than l.L e t
X,X0 ⊂ Z be two sets of cardinality l +1a n dl e tα =
P
Y ⊂X μ( ¯ f−1(Y )) and α0 =
36P
Y 0⊂X0 μ( ¯ f−1(Y 0)), β =
P
Y ⊂Z\X μ( ¯ f−1(Y )) and β0 =
P
Y 0⊂Z\X0 μ( ¯ f−1(Y 0)). Let A =
S
z∈X f−1(z),A 0 =
S
z∈X0 f−1(z),g = yAx,g0 = yA0x, h = xAiy,g0 = xA0
iy and arguing
as above, we note that g and g0 yield the same lotteries and h and h0 yield the same





μ( ¯ f−1(Y )) =
X
Y ⊂X0
μ( ¯ f−1(Y )) = α0
The inductive hypothesis ensures that μ( ¯ f−1(Y )) = μ( ¯ f−1(Y 0)) whenever |Y | = |Y 0|,
Y ⊂ X and Y 0 ⊂ X0. This together with the equation above ensures that μ( ¯ f−1(X)) =
μ( ¯ f−1(X0)) and completes the proof of Step 1.




















Step 2: μ∗(f−1(X)) = γk(|X|/k) for all X ⊂ Z.
T op r o v eS t e p2 ,n o t et h a tμ∗(f−1(X)) =
P
























This proves step 2.





37First, assume that k is a multiple of m that is, k = mr for some r.C o n s i d e rPk and
let Z = {z1,...,z k} and f be deﬁned as above. Deﬁne g as follows:
g(Ajr+l)=f(Ajr+1)
for all j =0 ,1,...,m−1a n dl =1 ,...,r. Hence, on each block of r consecutive events At,
as t ranges between two multiples of r,s a yt = jr+1 ,...,(j +1) r, g yields f(Ajr+1), the
outcome of f on the ﬁrst of these events. For j =0 ,...,m,l e tAj = Ajr+1 ∪...∪A(j+1)r
be the union of each such sequence of events. Let
Ψ+ = {X ⊂ Z |∀j =0 ,...,m∃l =1 ,...,rs.t. f(Ajr+l) ∈ X}
Ψ− = {X ⊂ Z |X/ ∈ Ψ+}
Ψ
−
i = {X ⊂ Z |X ∈ Ψ
−
i and |X| = i}
Note that













j = ∅ whenever i 6= j. Hence, for all N,
X
X∈Ψ−
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X∈Ψ+















μ( ¯ f−1(X)) +
X
{X∈Ψ+}

















Choose N so that m
¡m−1
m









Step 4: For every  >0t h e r ei sN<∞ such that
Prk
j=N a(t,rk) ≤   for all rk ≥ N.
Since ºl is a continuous preference on FA it follows that for every  >0t h e r ei sk such
that μ∗(f−1(X)) > 1− /2f o r|X| = k−1 and therefore 1−γk((k−1)/k)=a(k,k) <  / 2.
Now the result follows from Step 3.
Let b(j),j=1 ,2,...be the pointwise limit of a convergent subsequence of μ(j,kr),j=
1,2...,kras r →∞ .F r o ms t e p4i tf o l l o w st h a t
P∞
















Fix   and choose N so that
Prk































































b(j) −  
Since   was arbitrary this proves Step 4.
Step 5 proves the Lemma for all A ∈ A with π(A) rational. Since ºl is continuous it
is straightforward to extend the argument to all A ∈ A.
Lemma C3: For every a ∈ Z there exists a prior (A,π) such that μ∗(A)=γa(A).
Proof: First, we construct a risky environment corresponding to an, i.e., γa(t)=tn.L e t
fj, j =1 ,...,nbe a collection of acts such that
(i) fj ∈ FE for all j;
(ii) fj is uniformly distributed for all j;T h a ti s ,i fλ is Lebesgue measure and B is the
Borel σ-algebra on [l,m]t h e nμ(f
−1
j (B)) = λ(B)/(m − l)f o rB ∈ B.
(iii) fi and fj are independent for all i,j ∈ {1,...,n};T h a ti s ,μ(f
−1
j (B) ∩ f
−1
i (B0)) =
λ(B)λ(B0) for all B,B0 ∈ B and all i,j.
Let D = {D1,...,D n} be a partition of Ω into n diﬀuse sets and let
f = f1D1f2D2 ...f nDn
Deﬁne A be the collection of sets {f−1(B)|B ∈ B} and let π : A → [0,1] be such that
π(f−1(B)) = λ(B) for all B ∈ B.N o t et h a t( A,π)i sap r i o r .
Next, we show that μ∗(A)=π(A)n for A ∈ A.L e tB ∈ B and note that μ∗(A∩D)=





































Since μ∗(A)=1− μ∗(Ac)t h i si m p l i e st h a tμ∗(A)=π(B)n as desired.
Next, consider arbitrary a ∈ Z.L e t {E1,E 2,...} be a partition of Ω such that
μ(En)=an.L e t f1,f 2 ... be a countable set of independent acts such that each fi is
uniformly distributed on every Ej.T h a ti s ,i fλ is Lebesgue measure and B is the Borel σ-
algebra on [l,m]t h e nμ(f
−1
j (B)∩Ej)/μ(Ej)=λ(B)/(m−l)f o rB ∈ B.L e t{D1,D 2,...}
be a partition of Ω into countably many diﬀuse sets. Let f be such that f = fk on Di∩Ej
for k =m i n {i,j}.H e n c e , o n En the act f yields f1,...,f n on n disjoint diﬀuse sets.
Deﬁne A be the collection of sets {f−1(B)|B ∈ B} and let π : A → [0,1] be such that
π(f−1(B)) = λ(B) for all B ∈ B.N o t et h a t( A,π)i sap r i o r .T h ea r g u m e n ta b o v ea p p l i e d
to each En shows that μ∗(A)=γa(π(A)).
Proof of Theorem 2: Lemma C1 and Lemma C3 prove part (i) of the Theorem. Lemma
C1 and C2 prove part (ii).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Lemma C1 proves part (i) of Proposition 1. Part (ii) is a
corollary of Theorem 2.
11. Appendix D: Proof of Propositions 2 -9
Proof of Proposition 2: First, we show that (i) implies (iii). Let u(x,y) >u (x,x)a n d
let F be the lottery that yields y with probability   and x with probability 1 −  .C h o o s e
  so that u(x,y) > (1 −  )u(x,x)+ u(y,y). Consider an environment with parameter an.
Then,
V (F)=( 1−  )nu(x,x)+ nu(y,y)+( 1− (1 −  )n −  n)u(x,y)
As n →∞this converges to u(x,y) and hence the decision maker is not risk averse for
n suﬃciently large. From a standard argument it follows that v(x): =u(x,x)m u s tb e
concave.
41N e x t ,w es h o wt h a t( i i i )i m p l i e s( i ) .A s s u m et h a tu(x,y)=v(x) for some concave v.




v(x)d[1 − γa(1 − G(x))]
Since [1−γa(1−Gf(x))] is concave it we can apply Theorem 1 in Chew, Karni and Safra
(1987) to conclude V is risk averse.
Next, we show that (iii) if and only if (ii). Let f,g be such that f is an interval
act for both f and g.L e t h = αf +( 1− α)g and note that f1 ≤ h1 ≤ h2 ≤ f2.I t
follows that U(h) ≥ U(f). To prove the reverse direction, let D1,D 2,D 3 be a partition
of Ω into three diﬀuse sets. Let f = x(D1 ∪ D2)y and g = x(D1 ∪ D3)y with y>x .
Clearly f and g share the same interval act f1 = x,f2 = y.L e t h = αf +( 1− α)g
and note that h1 = x,h2 = αx +( 1− α)y is an interval act for h. Therefore, we have
U(f)=U(g)=u(x,y)a n dU(h)=u(x,αx+(1−α)y). Uncertainty aversion requires that
U(h) ≥ U(f) and therefore u(x,αx +( 1− α)y) ≥ u(x,y). Since α was arbitrary and u is
continuous it follows that u(x,y)=u(x,x)a sd e s i r e d .
Proof of Proposition 3: Let F be the lottery that yields m with probability t and l
with probability 1 − t. Then, for the GQU (a,u) with maximally pessimistic u,
V (F)=γa(t)u(m,m)+( 1− γa(t))u(l,l)
It follows that γa(t) ≥ γb(t) for all t if FB is more uncertain than FA.
For the converse, let (E,μ,u)w i t hu(x,y)=v(x)b ea nE U U .L e tf be an interval act
for f.L e tH be the cumulative corresponding to f1.N o t et h a t
H(x)=μ({ω ∈ Ω : f1(ω) ≤ x})
=1− μ∗({ω ∈ Ω : f(ω) >x })







v(x)d[1 − γ(1 − Gf(x))]
42Let (A,π),(B,ρ) be two issues with PTF γ and γ0 respectively. Let f ∈ FA,g∈ FB and




v(x)d[1 − γ(1 − Gf(x))] ≥
Z m
l
v(x)d[1 − γ0(1 − Gf(x))] = U(g)
Proof of Proposition 4: First, we show that (i) implies (ii). Since u is continuous and
not maximally pessimistic, there exists x,y such that u(x,y) >u (x,x)a n du(x,z) <u (x,y)
for z<y .L e t w = ρ−1
u (u(x,y). Let F be the lottery that yields x and y with equal
probabilities. If γa(3/4) is suﬃciently close to zero, then the GQU (a,u) prefers the
sure prospect (w + y)/2o v e rF, but prefers the lottery G = 1/ 2F + 1/ 2x over the lottery
H = 1/ 2
w+y
2 + 1/ 2x. To see this, note that the certainty equivalent of F and of G both
converge to w as γa(3/4) → 0. The certainty equivalent of H converges to ρ−1(u(
w+y
2 ,x))
and therefore the assertion follows from the fact that u(x,y) is strictly decreasing in its
second argument at (x,y).
Next, we show that (ii) implies (i). Fix an environment a ∈ Z and assume u is
maximally pessimistic and let v(x)=u(x,y). Then,
V (F)=
Z
v(x)d[1 − (1 − γa(F(x))]
Let F,x,z be such that V (z) >V(F)a n dx ≤ y(F). Thus, v(y) >V(F) and therefore
γa(α)v(y)+( 1− γa(α))v(x) >γ a(α)V (F)+( 1− γa(α))v(x)( †)
for all α ∈ (0,1). Let H be the cdf such that
H(z)=1− γa(α)+γa(α)(1 − γa(1 − F(z))
for all z ∈ [x,m]a n dl e tG be the cdf such that
G(z)=1− γa(1 − αF(x))
43for all z ∈ [x,m]. Then,




V (αF +( 1− α)x)=
Z
vdG
Below, we show that H ﬁrst order stochastically dominates G. Together with inequality
(†)t h i sp r o v e st h ea s s e r t i o n .N o t et h a t
G(z)=1− γa(1 − α + α(1 − F(z))
≥ 1 − γa(1 − α) − γ(α(1 − F(z))
≥ 1 − γa(1 − α) − γa(α)γa(1 − F(z))
= H(z)




















2(y−x).L e t F be the lottery that yields x with probability α and y>xwith
probability 1−α and assume . Then, for γa(1−α)s u ﬃciently close to zero, Va(F)i sc l o s e
to u(x,y) and therefore the certainty equivalent of F is close to z. Since the expected value
of F is less than z this shows that the decision maker is risk loving in environments that
are suﬃciently uncertain.
To show that (iii) implies (i) let u be maximally pessimistic. Let F be a simple
lottery, let x b et h el o w e s tp r i z ei ni t ss u p p o r ta n dl e tα be the probability of x.T h e n ,
V (F) ≥ γa(1 − α)u(m,m)+( 1− γa(1 − α))u(x,x). Hence, if γa(1 − α) is close to zero
then V (F)i sc l o s et ou(x,x) and therefore the DM prefers the expected value of F to F
under extreme uncertainty. By continuity, this argument can be extended to all lotteries
and hence the decision maker is not risk loving under extreme uncertainty.
44Proof of Proposition 5: Let (α,v) be the interval utility and consider an environment

















v(x)d[αγan ◦ F +( 1− α)γ∗
an ◦ F]
and hence the proposition holds for all an.S i n c ea l la ∈ Z are convex combinations of an’s
the proposition follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :To simplify the notation, we assume that M =[ 0 ,1], that
is, the prizes are between 0 and 1. As in the proof of Lemma C3, we construct a risky
environment corresponding to a2, i.e., γa(t)=t2.L e tfj, j =1 ,2 be a collection of acts
such that
(i) fj ∈ FE for all j;
(ii) fj is uniformly distributed for all j;T h a ti s ,i fλ is Lebesgue measure and B is the
Borel σ-algebra on [0,1] then μ(f
−1
j (B)) = λ(B)f o rB ∈ B.




2 (B0)) = λ(B)λ(B0)f o ra l lB,B0 ∈ B.
Let D be a diﬀuse subset of Ω and deﬁne A be the collection of sets {f−1(B)|B ∈ B}
and let π : A → [0,1] be such that π(f−1(B)) = λ(B) for all B ∈ B. As we show in the
proof of Lemma C3, (A,π)i sap r i o ra n dFA is a risky environment.
Let p and q be two possible probabilities (as in the deﬁnition of an urn experiment).
Recall that ι(L)=p(L)=q(L)f o ra l lL ∈ M and p(L) 6= q(L)f o rL 6∈ M.D e ﬁne the















45Let T : Ω → N be deﬁned as follows:
T(ω)=
½
g1(ω)i f ω ∈ D
g2(ω)i f ω ∈ Dc
Clearly, T−1(L) ∈ FA for all L ∈ M. Next, we show that there is no risky environment
that contains FA and T−1(L)f o rL 6∈ M,L ⊂ N. Recall that for A ∈ FA,t h er e v e a l e d
prior is π(A)=
p
μ∗(A). Let Ei = g
−1
i (L) and deﬁne B := T−1(L)=E1DE2.C o n s i d e r
the act h = xBy
U(h)= μ∗(B)u(x,x)+μ∗(Bc)u(y,y)+( 1− μ∗(B) − μ∗(Bc))u(x,y)
=p(L)q(L)u(x,x)+( 1− q(L))(1 − p(L))u(y,y)
+( p(L)(1 − q(L)) + q(L)(1 − p(L)))u(x,y)
Then, by construction, μ∗(B)=p(L) · q(L). By Lemma C2, if B ∈ FA then p := π(B)=
p
p(L) · q(L)a n dt h e r e f o r eh must correspond to a lottery F that yields x with probability
p and y with probability 1 − p. The utility of such a lottery in environment FA is
V (F)=p2u(x,x)+( 1− p)2u(y,y)+2 p(1 − p)u(x,y)
Since 2p(1−p) >p (L)(1−q(L))+q(L)(1−p(L)) this implies that V (F) >U(h)f o ra l lu
such that u(x,y) <u (y,y) and therefore B 6∈ FA. This completes the proof of Proposition
6.
Proof of Proposition 7: Let ρ be a Machina preference and deﬁne u(x,y)=2 ρ(x,y)
for all (x,y) ∈ I.C h o o s ead i ﬀuse set D a n da ni d e a ls e tE ∈ E for the probability (E,μ)
such that μ(E)=1 /2. Let A1 = D ∩ E, A2 = Dc ∩ E, A3 = D ∩ Ec and A4 = D∩Ec.
For S = {1,2,3,4} and φ ∈ FS,l e tf(ω)=φ(s). Then, let y1 =m a x {φ(1),φ(2)},
y2 =m a x {φ(3),φ(4)}, x1 =m i n {φ(1),φ(2)} and x2 =m i n {φ(1),φ(2)} and
Z
u(f)dμ = .5[u(x1,y 1)+u(x2,y 2)] = ρ(x1,y 1)+ρ(x2,y 2)=ρ(φ(1),φ(2)) + ρ(φ(3),φ(4))
as desired.
46That separability precludes M-reversals is obvious. To conclude the proof, we will
show that if there are no M-reversals, then the u that satisﬁes the above equation must be
separable. No M-reversals implies
u(x1,y 1)+u(x2,y 2)=u(x1,y 2)+u(x2,y 1)( 5 5 )
whenever (x1,y 2),u(x2,y 1) ∈ I.D e ﬁne v2(y)=u(l,y)a n dv1(x)=u(x,m) − u(l,m).
Then, v1(x)+v2(y)=u(x,m)−u(l,m)+u(l,y) and equation (55) ensures that u(x,m)−
u(l,m)=u(x,y) − u(l,y). Therefore, v1(x)+v2(y)=u(x,y) for all x,y,p r o v i n gt h e
separability of u.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 : T h e o r e m1i m p l i e st h a tf o rt h em aximally pessimistic EUU,
and any simple act h with prizes in the ﬁnite set Z ⊂ [l,m], U(h)=
P
x∈Z u(x)μ∗(h−1(z0 ≥
z)). Therefore, to proof Proposition 7 it suﬃces to show that there is T : Ω → N such that
μ∗(T−1(M)) = ρ(M)f o ra l lM ⊂ N.S i n c e ρ is totally monotone, there is a probability
e : N → [0,1] such that ρ(M)=
P
M0⊂M e(M). Partition Ω into 2n − 1 ideal events
{EM,M ∈ M} so that μ(EM)=e(M). For |M| =1l e tT(EM)=i such that {i} = M.
For |M| > 1p a r t i t i o nEM into |M| diﬀuse sets and assign each of those sets one elements








as desired. This proves Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 9: Let (E,μ,(α,v)) be the EUU. Partition Ω into 2n − 1i d e a l
events {EM,M ∈ M} so that μ(EM)=e(M). For |M| =1l e tT(EM)=i such that
{i} = M.F o r |M| > 1p a r t i t i o nEM into |M| diﬀuse sets and assign each of those sets
one elements of M,s ot h a tT−1(EM)=M.L e tf : N → [l,m]a n dl e th : Ω → [l,m]s u c h













where V (f)i st h eα−MEU utility of act f.
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